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THE LAW ON ULTRA VIRES ACTS AND
CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS
By FRANK A. MACK*
ULTRA VIRES ACTS AND CONTRACTS OF CORPORATIONSA CORPORATION is an artificial being independent of members
that compose it, existing by law and because of law, and is
capable of contracting, suing and being sued in its name, having a
residence, having an intent, malice, and a perpetual succession.'
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
The term "ultra vires," in ifs proper sense, "denotes some act or
transaction on the part of a corporation which, although not unlaw-
ful or contrary to public policy if done or executed by an individual,
is yet beyond the legitimate powers of the corporation as they are
defined by the statutes under which it is formed, or which are ap-
plicable to it, or by its charter or incorporation papers." 2 Machen,
Corp. Sec. 1012.
In considering the cases in which the law applicable to corporations
is discussed, it must be borne in mind that there are several classes
of rights to which they apply, and that upon the same state of facts,
the legal consequeices might be different with reference to the dif-
ferent classes of rights. Thus there are corporate rights which pertain
to the corporation as an artificial legal entity, in other words, a distinct
person; individual rights of the stockholders, and rights of the creditors
of the corporation. The rights of strangers dealing with the corpor-
ation will vary according as they are considered with reference to the
corporation itself, the stockholders, orthe creditors of the corporation.
The stockholders and those dealing with the corporation are the only
parties directly interested in their acts, so long as the corporation
confines itself within the general scope of its powers. The rights of
the corporation, and of strangers dealing with the corporation, may
in some respects, vary according to the circumstances surrounding a
given transaction.
As to the exact nature of an ultra vires act, the decisions are con-
flicting. Some courts regard an ultra vires act as they would an illegal
act, while others regard it as a mere nullity. Still others regard it as
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
1 Professor Lang's definition.
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perfectly valid and binding unless the sovereign state sees fit to inter-
fere. An act is said to be ultra vires when it is not within the scope of
the powers of the corporation to perform it under any circumstances
or for any purpose. An act is also sometimes said to be ultra vires
with reference to the rights of certain parties, when the corporation
is not authorized to perform it without their consent, or with refer-
ence to some specific purpose, when it is not atithorized to perform
it for that purpose, although fully within the scope of the general
powers of the corporation, with the consent of the parties interested
or for some other purpose. And the rights of third persons dealing
with corporations may vary, according as the act is ultra vires in
one or the other of these senses. These distinctions must be borne
in mind in considering a question arising out of dealings with a cor-
poration. When an act is ultra vires in the first sense mentioned,
it is generally void in toto, and the corporation may avail itself of
the plea. But when it is ultra vires in the second sense, the right of
the corporation to avail itself of the plea will depend upon the cir-
cumstances of the case.
The question, as between stockholders and the corporation, is a
different one from that which arises between the corporation itself
and third persons dealing with it, and the principle established by the
courts in their decisions where the suit arises between third persons
and the corporation is, whether the act in question is one whih the
corporation is not authorized to perform under any circumstances,
or one that may be performed by the corporation for some purposes,
but may not for others. In the former case the defense of ultra vires
is available to the corporation as against all persons, because they
are bound to know from the law of its existence that it has no power
to perform the act. But in the latter case the defense may or may
not be available, depending upon the question whether the party deal-
ing with the corporation is aware of the intention to perform the act
for an authorized purpose, or under circumstances not justifying its
performance. The test as between third persons having no knowledge
of an unlawful purpose and the corporation, is to compare the terms
of the contract with the provisions of the law from which the cor-
poration derives its powers, and if the court can see that the act to
be performed is beyond the powers of the corporation for any pur-
pose, the contract cannot be enforced, otherwise it can. Using the
language of Mr. justice Selden:
"Where the want of power is apparent, upon comparing the act
done with the terms of the charter, the party dealing with the cor-
poration is presumed to have knowledge of the defect, and the de-
fense of ultra vires is available against him. But such a defense
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would not be permitted to prevail against a party who cannot be pre-
sumed to have had any knowledge of the want of authority to make
the contract. Hence, if the question of power depends not merely
upon the law under which the corporation acts, but upon the exis-
tence of certain extrinsic facts resting peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the corporate officers, then the corporation would, I appre-
hend, be estopped from denying that which (by assuming to make
the contract), it had virtually affirmed." 2
Third persons are presumed to know the law of the land, and they
are bound, when dealing with the corporations, to know the powers
conferred by their charter. These are open to their inspection, and
it is easy to determine whether the act is within the scope of the
general powers for that purpose. But they have no access to the
private papers of the corporation, or to the motives which govern
directors and stockholders, and no means for knowing the purposes
for which an act, that may be lawful for some purposes, is done.
The very fact that the appointed officers of the corporation assume to
do an act in the apparent performance of their duties which they are
authorized to perform for the lawful purposes of the- corporation,
is a representation to those dealing with them that the act performed
is for a proper purpose. Such is the presumption of the law, and
upon this presumption, third persons having no notice in fact of the
unlawful purposes, are entitled to rely.3
Upon any other principle there would be no safety in dealing with
corporations, and the business operations of these institutions would
be greatly crippled, while the interests of the stockholders and the
public, and their general usefulness would be seriously impaired. The
officers are appointed by the corporation and if any loss results to
third persons dealing with the corporation from their misrepresenta-
tion in matters within the general scope of their duties, it should fall
upon the corporation, which is responsible for their appointment, rather
than upon parties who have no other means of ascertaining the facts,
and must rely upon their assurances or not deal with the corpora-
tion at all.
ULTRA VIREs DISTINGUISHED FROM ILLEGALITY
An ultra vires act is not necessarily an illegal act. The two are not
the same. Much of the confusion in the decisions has arisen from
the failure to distinguish between the two. An ultra vires act may
222 N.Y. 290 Bissell v. The Michigan Southern and Indiana Railroad Com-
pany (1853).
3Bank of United States v. Danbridge, 12 Wheat 64.
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also be an illegal act. The two overlap but they are not the same.
For example: Suppose that a corporation organized to manufacture
automobiles contracts to provide homes for its employees. This act
would not be illegal nor is it forbidden by statute; it is simply an un-
authorized act. The automobile manufacturing corporation is doing
something which is ultra vires and quite unauthorized by the terms
of its charter, but it is doing nothing illegal. The contract is neither
malum prohibitum or malum in se. On the other hand, suppose that
a corporation organized to operate a department store engages a
gangster to murder a competing rival. The gangster murders the
competitor. This contract is not only ultra vires of the department
store, but it is illegal as well. The distinction between the two, (ultra
vires on the one hand, and illegality upon the other), seems obvious.
The distinction is of great importance from the practical point of
view. The law is well settled that there never can be a recovery upon
an illegal contract. As an ultra vires contract is not necessarily an
illegal one, the rules which are applicable to illegal contracts are not
at all decisive in the cases of ultra vires.4
ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS
The doctrine of ultra vires has been thoroughly discussed within
the- last thirty years, and its extent and limitations clearly defined.
Two propositions are settled. 5 One is that a contract by which a cor-
poration disables itself from performing the functions and duties
undertaken and imposed by its charter is, unless the state which created
it consents, ultra vires. A charter not only grants rights, but it also
imposes duties. An acceptance of those rights is an assumption of
those duties. Since it is a contract which prevents the state from in-
terfering with those rights, so it is one which binds the corporation
not to abandon the discharge of those duties. It is a contract whose
obligations neither the state nor corporation can abandon, without
the consent of the other.
The second is that the powers of a corporation are such- as its
charter confers, and an act beyond the measure.of those powers is
ultra vires. A corporation has no natural or inherent rights or capaci-
ties. Since the corporation is a creature of the state, it has such powers
as the state has seen fit to give it, and nothing more. Consequently,
when it assumes to do that which it has not been empowered by the
state to do, its assumption of power is in vain, and the courts will
4 Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company v. Riche, 9 Ex. 224, 7H.L. 653.
5 Central Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car. Company, 139" U.
S. 24, Sup. Ct. Rep. 478 (1891).
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construe such an act a nullity, and the contract is ultra vires. These
two propositions embrace the whole doctrine of ultra vires.
The reasons why a corporation is not liable upon a contract ultra
vires, which is beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature,
and varying from the objects of its creation as declared in the law
of its organization are:
First: The interest of the public, that the corporation shall not
transcend the powers granted.
Second: The interest of the stockholders, that the capital shall not
be subjected to the risk of enterprises not contemplated by the charter,
and therefore not authorized for the stock.
Third: The obligation of everyone, entering in a contract with a
corporation, to take notice of the legal limits of its powers.5 1
These three reasons are clearly brought out in the unanimous judg-
ment of the United States Supreme Court, delivered by Mr. Justice
Campbell, in the leading case of Pearce v. Mladison and Indianapolis
Railroad, 21 How, 441, in which it was held that a railroad corpora-
tion was not liable to be sued upon promissory notes which it had
given in payment for a steamboat received and used by it, and run-
ning in connection with its railroad.
In Wisconsin a corporation cannot enforce a contract not author-
ized by its charter.6 Nor can one made by it for an unauthorized
purpose be enforced against it.7 But one within its general and un-
restricted powers is valid.8 A corporation having, within its author-
ity under its charter, guaranteed the debts of other parties, and hav-
ing paid such debt on default of the principal debtors, cannot enforce
the securities given to it by the latter parties to indemnify it for mak-
ing such guaranty.9
A corporation is not only incapable of making contracts which are
forbidden by its charter, but, in general, it can make none which are
not necessary either directly or indirectly to effect the objects of its
creative, and a contract made by a corporation, which is entirely for-
eign to the purposes of its creation, is void.10 While contracts made
5% Central Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Company, 139
U.S. 24, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478 (1891).
6 Madison, W. & M. Plank Road Company v. Watertown and Plank Road,
7 Wis. 59 (1873); Rock River Bank v. Sherwood, 10 Wis. 230 (1860).
7 Northwestern Union Packet Company v. Shaw, 35 Wis. 655 (1874).
8 Wausau Boom Company v. Plumer, 35 Wis. 274 (1884).
9 Madison, W. & M. Plank Road Company v. Waterton and Plank Road,
7 Wis. 59 (1859).
10 Rock River Bank v. Sherwood, 10 Wis. 230 (1860).
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by corporations, which they have no authority to make, may be void,
yet those which are within the general scope of their powers will be
valid, although in some particulars in excess of those powers, unless
by reason of such excess they are against public policy."
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
Where a contract is purely executory: that is, where nothing had
been done by either party, there cannot be any recovery either by or
against the corporation for breach of an ultra vires contract. A mere
executory ultra vires contract can never be made the foundation of
an action either by or against the corporation. In a famous decision
by the Supreme Court of the United States, a corporation sought to
obtain in equity the specific performance of a contract to convey lands
to it. In deciding against the corporation, on the ground that the
contract still remained unexecuted, Mr. Justice Miller said: "While
a court might hesitate to declare the title to land already received and
in the possession and ownership of the company void on the principle
that they had no authority to take such lands, it is very clear that
it will not make itself the active agent of the company in violating the
law and enabling the company to do that which the law forbids."'"
The minority holds that even an executory contract can only be at-
tacked by the state.
The theory upon which our courts refuse to sanction a redovery
upon an executory ultra vires corporate contract is very simple. After
all, a corporate contract which is ultra vires is an unauthorized con-
tract and one which the state had not permitted or sanctioned. There-
fore, the courts, which are the agency of the state, should not lend
their aid in order to carry out such a contract which is still wholly
unexecuted. For example, suppose that a retail grocery corporation
has agreed to purchase several thousand yards of silk from X. The
corporation refuses to take the silk when X delivers it on the ground
that it is unauthorized to enter into such a contract. The contract is
entirely executory. The courts are practically unanimous in holding
that X cannot recover damages from the corporation. Take the re-
verse situation. Suppose that X refuses to deliver the silk to the cor-
poration. The grocery corporation cannot sue and recover damages
for the breach of the contract. In other words, the courts will not
lend their aid in order to enable parties to effectuate an ultra vires
contract. In fact, it is the duty of either party to withdraw from such
"LGermantown Farmers' Mutual Insurance Company v. Dhei,, 43 Wis. 420
(1878).
2Case v. Kelly, 133 U.S. 21 (1890).
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a contract, and.when this is done no action for breach of contract
will lie at law, and in equity specific performance will not be de-
creed.13
The reasons why a corporation cannot sue or be sued upon such
an ultra vires contract are stated above.
EXECUTED CONTRACTS
Just as the court will not interfere with executory ultra vires con-
tracts, so it will not interfere with ultra vires contracts when fully
executed by those parties. It will not disturb such an executed con-
tract upon the complaint either of the corporation or the other con-
tracting party, but the court will leave the parties in status quo-that
is, where they have placed themselves by their own actions and where
it finds them. In Long v. Georgia Pacific Railroad Company, 91 Ala.
519, 8 So. 706 (1890), Long and his wife executed to the railway
company a deed of certain valuable mineral interests in the land. The
bill sought to have the deed declared void because of this incapacity
of the corporation, and to have it cancelled as a cloud upon Long's
title. The corporation demurred. The court decided that, as the con-
tract was duly executed on both sides, it- would not interfere. McClel-
lan, Justice, said: "The law will not interfere, at the instance of either
party, to undo that which it was originally unlawful to do, and to the
doing of which, so long as the contract to that end remained executory,
neither party could have coerced the other." The court left the parties
where they had placed themselves.
PARTIALLY EXECUTED CONTRACTS
Where a contract has been partially executed, there are two views
as to its legal effect. The rule maintained in the Supreme Court of
the United States is that an ultra vires contract is absolutely null and
void, and that no action in any form can be maintained upon the con-
tract itself.'14 It is followed by a few, but rejected by most of the
State courts. In New York and in the majority of the state courts,
the rule is that if the contract is partially executed, the party who
has performed on his part may sue and recover upon the contract, and
the other party is estopped from denying the validity of the agreement.
This rule is followed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 15
-3 Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N.Y. 115 (1884); Chicago Ry. Co. v. Union Pa-
cific Railroad Company, 47 Fed. 15 (1891).
'1 131 U.S. 371 Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Colmpany (1889).
'5 McElroy v. Mim Percheron Horse Company, 96 Wis. 317 (1897) ; Security
National Bank v. St. Croix Power Company, 117 Wis. 211 (1920); Witter v.
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Suppose that a gun manufacturing corporation orders several rail-
road box cars from a car manufacturing corporation. In the federal
courts, the car corporation could not sue and recover from the gun
corporation the agreed price of the cars. In other words, the car cor-
poration would have no remedy upon the contract itself. Whatever
remedy the car corporation would have would be in an action on quasi-
contract to recover the reasonable value of the cars fi-om the gun
corporation and to prevent the unjust enrichment of the gun corpora-
tion at the expense of the car corporation. 'But in New York, and in
Wisconsin the car corporation would be allowed to recover the agreed
purchase price of the cars in an action brought against the gun cor-
poration for breach of contract. The gun corporation, having received
the benefits of the contract, would be estopped from raising the de-
fense that it was unauthorized by its charter to purchase cars of that
sort. The New York and Wisconsin courts say that the gun corpora-
tion should not.be privileged to say that it is without authority where
it has received and retained the benefits of the contract. Consequently,
in New York, Wisconsin, and some of the other jurisdictions, the
partially executed ultra vires contract is unquestionably enforcible, ac-
cording'to its terms, by the party who has performed on its part.
The federal is commonly known as the strict rule. In the federal
courts the view is taken that there can never be a recovery upon the
contract itself. As was said by Mr. Justice Gray in a leading case: 16
"All contracts made by a corporation beyond the scope of its powers
are unlawful and void, and no action can be maintained upon them
in the courts upon three distinct grounds," which were stated above.
A contract which is unlawful and void because beyond the scope of
the corporate powers does not become lawful and valid by being car-
ried into execution. No action, under any circumstances, can be main-
tained upon the unlawful or according to its terms. So where a rail-
road corporation acted in excess of its powers and leased all of its
property to another railroad corporation, the court would hold that
the lessor could not recover the rentals which had accrued under the
contract.
In the example given above, what would be the remedy of the lessor
corporation? The Supreme Court of the United States would answer
that the lessor corporation should disaffirm the contract of lease and
sue to recover on a quantum reruit, which would constitute the rea-
Milling Company, 78 Wis. 543 (1891); Bigelow v. R Company, 104 Wis. 109,
(1899); Eastman v. Parkinson, 133 Wis. 375 (1907); Lewis v. A-mer. Savings
& Loan Association, 98 Wis. 283 (1898).
16 Central 'Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Company, 139
U.S. 24, 35 L. Ed. 55 (1891).
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sonable value of what the defendant corporation has actually received
the benefit of. To maintain such action the lessor corporation would
have to disaffirm the ultra vires contract.
The court recognizes that there can be no recovery upon the con-
tract itself. But, in order to do justice between the parties, it permits
property or money parted with on the faith of the unlawful contract,
to be recovered back, or compensation paid for same. This the court
permitted to be done in another leading case.
7
It is plain that the federal courts, while they do not permit a re-
covery upon the contract itself, nevertheless they recognize that a party
should not receive and retain property without making adequate com-
pensation for it, and permit the party to resort to the doctrine of
quasi-contract, in which a promise is implied and a recovery can be
had for the reasonable value of that which has been received and
retained.
The New York and the Wisconsin rule is commonly known as the
liberal rule. In New York, Wisconsin, and many other jurisdictions,
one who has received from a corporation the full consideration of his
promise cannot avail himself of the objection that the contract fully
performed by the corporation was ultra vires, not within its chartered
powers. The New York courts insist that it would be contrary to the
first principles of equity to allow such a defense to prevail in an
action by the corporation.. In a leading case, 8 a corporation entered
into a contract with a corporation organized to manufacture firearms
and other implements of warfare, to furnish to it twenty thousand
railroad locks. The plaintiff, the firearms corporation, made and de-
livered ten thousand locks under the contract and as to the residue
the contract was rescinded by mutual consent. It was conceded that
the manufacturing and selling of railroad locks was not within the
purposes for which the firearms corporation was incorporated, or
within-the powers conferred upon it by its charter. Yet it was unan-
imously held -that the plea of ultra vires could not prevail because
the defendant corporation has received the full benefit of the contract.
Mr. Justice Allen said: "It is now very well settled that a corporation
cannot avail itself of the defense of ultra vires when the contract
has been, in good faith, fully performed by the other party, and the
corporation has had the full benefit of the performance and of the
contract. * * * The same rule holds converso. If the other party
has had the benefit of the contract fully performed by the corpora-
17 Pulhlran's Palace Car Company v. Central Transportation Company, 171
U.S. 138, 43 L. Ed. 108 (1897).
Is Whitney Arms Company v. Barlow, 63 N.Y. 62 (1877).
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tion, he will not be heard to object that the contract and performance
were not within the legitimate powers of the corporation."
In other words: the party who has had the benefit of the ultra
vires contract cannot be permitted to question its validity in an action
upon it.19
Then we also have the rule commonly known as the intermediate
rule between the Federal rule, known as the strict rule and New York
and Wisconsin rule, known as the liberal rule. This rule prevails in
several jurisdictions, including Illinois, in which the courts draw a
distinction between want of power, on the one hand, and abuse of
power, on the other. There is an absolute want of power to make
the contract, they hold that there can never be any recovery upon
the agreement itself. As was said by Chief Justice Cartwright,
of the Supreme Court of Illinois: "It would be contradictory to say
that a contract is void for an absolute want of power to make it, and
yet it may become a legal and valid contract by way of estoppel, through
some other act of the party under some incapacity, or some act of the
other party chargeable by law with notice of the want of power." 20
On the other hand, where there exists only an abuse of power and
the act is within the general scope of the corporate powers, the Illinois
courts apply the doctrine of estoppel as applied in New York.
It would be difficult to make a line of demarkation between want
of power and abuse of power. In my opinion the distinction is of
questionable value. If the Illinois rule confines the doctrine of estoppel
to those cases where the contract is within the powers of the cor-
poration, but only beyond the mere authority of its officers or agents,
the rule will be more readily understood by the student. But gather-
ing from the decisions of the Illinois courts, the rule is not confined
within these limits.
AcQuIsITION OF PROPERTY
Suppose that a corporation takes a conveyance of real estate which
is unauthorized by its charter. The question to determine is: Is the
conveyance to the corporation void? The courts are practically unan-
imous in answering this question in the negative. Mr. Justice Hughes
in a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States'
said: "In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intention to
the contrary, a conveyance of real estate to a corporation for a pur-
19 Bath Gas Light Company v. Claffy, 151 N.Y. 24, 45 N.E. 390 (1896).
20 National Home Building v. Loan Association Home Savings Bank, 181 Ill.
35, 54 N.E. 619 (1899).
2 lKerfoot v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 218 U.S. 281 (1910).
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pose not authorized by its charter is not void but voidable, and the
sovereign alone can object. Neither the grantor nor his heirs nor
third persons can impugn it upon the ground that the grantee has ex-
ceeded its powers." This decision is in accord with the weight of
authority. The Supreme Court of Illinois stated the general rule to
be as follows: That where a corporation is incompetent by its charter
to take a title to real estate, a conveyance to it is not void, but only
voidable, and the sovereign state alone can object.22 In other words,
the conveyance is valid until attacked by the state in a direct proceeding
through its attorney general. This rule recognizes the authority of the
state which has created the corporation, to which the corporation is
subject, and also has the effect of assuring the security of title to
Real Estate and avoids many injurious consequences which may arise.
The title of the corporation to the Real Estate and its right to enjoy
the same cannot be inquired into collaterally in an action between the
corporation and a private party. It can be questioned by the state
only.
REcISSION OF ULTRA VIRES CONTRACTS
In a leading federal case,23 a railroad corporation leased its entire
railroad property and franchises to another railroad corporation for a
term of nine hundred and ninety-nine years in consideration of the
payment by the latter to the former of a certain portion of the gross
receipts.
The contract was fully executed by the actual transfer of the rail-
road property. The former corporation held the property and paid
the stipulated consideration, from time, for seventeen years. Then,
for the first time, the lessor corporation became dissatisfied, brought
suit in equity to cancel and set aside the instrument as beyond the
corporate powers of both corporations. The United States Supreme
Court, though conceding that the contract was ultra vires, decided
that no suit could be maintained to set aside and cancel the contract.
The parties, declared the court, should be left where they have placed
themselves.
But the maxim that where both parties are equally to blame, the
condition and position of the defendant are the better, was resorted
to in this case. This decision seems open to criticism because it for-
bids a corporation to renounce that portion of an ultra vires contract
which remains unexecuted. But some writers defend this decision on
22 Hamshkr v. Hamsher, 132 Illinois 273, 23 N.E. 1123 (1890).
23 St. Louis, Vandalia and T. H. R. Company v. Terre Haute and I. R. Com-
patty, 145 U.S. 393 (1892).
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the ground that the court should not interfere to afford affirmative
release either to enforce or to set aside this case; it should be noted
that the reasoning of the decision is extremely confusing and apparently
fails to distinguish between illegal and ultra vires contracts, although
the court repeatedly refers to the rules which govern illegal agree-
ments.
On the other hand, in a well known Wisconsin case,24 an action
was brought by a corporation engaged in the business of a common
carrier, upon a contract for the sale of wheat to be delivered to the
plaintiff's ship. One thousand dollars had been paid on account. The
contract was repudiated as ultra vires, and the plaintiff sought judg-
ment for the one thousand dollars paid on account, and for damages
for breach of the contract. The plaintiff was not entitled to damages,
said the court, but was entitled to the return of the consideration
paid. Consequently Wisconsin courts recognize the right of recision.
In general, it might be said that a corporation should be permitted
to withdraw from an agreement which is ultra vires. The court inter-
feres only to the extent of preventing the consummation of an un-
authorized agreement.2
DIRECTORs' LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED OR ILLEGAL AcTs
The directors of a corporation owe to it certain well defined duties.
Some of the more important duties may be enumerated as follows:
The duty of obedience, the duty of diligence, and the duty of loyalty.
The first and most important is the duty of obedience, which means
that the directors must keep within the scope of their chartered powers.
They are liable to the corporation for all ultra vires acts performed
by them. The stockholders may resort to injunction proceedings to
enjoin the performance of such acts where they have not yet been
performed. Where they already have been carried out, the remedy
of the stockholders is to hold the directors liable in equity and compel
them to account, or to seek a recision. Just as an agent must keep
within the scope of the authority vested in him by his principal, so
must the directors of a corporation keep within the scope of the author-
ity vested in them. For instance, the rule of law that dividends may
not be paid out of capital is well settled; consequently, the directors
would be personally liable if they were disobedient and ordered the
payment of dividends out of the capital stock.
24 Northwestern Union Packet Company v. Shaw, 37 Wis. 655 (1876).
125 McCutcheon v. Merz Capsule Company, 71 Fed. 787 (1896).
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MODERN TENDENCIES
Within recent years, some of the progressive jurisdictions have in-
sisted that the question of ultra vires is closely related to the rule that
only a state can inquire into the validity of a corporate existence by
a quo warranto proceeding. When the state.grants the charter to a
corporation with definite, specified powers, it should have the right
to inquire into all ultra vires contracts because it is a direct offense
against the sovereign of the state. If the state does not interfere, why
should private persons be permitted to raise the issue collaterally. If
this doctrine is adopted, it will protect all executory ultra vires con-
tracts from collateral attack as well as any other.
Only one leading case has been decided upon this quAtion, which is
a Kansas case.2 6 In this case Judge Mason said: "The court is con-
vinced of the soundness of the view that neither party to even an exe-
cutory contract should be allowed to defeat its enforcement by the
plea of ultra vires. The doctrine is logical in theory, simple in applica-
tion, and just in results." If this view gains ground it will mean that
the question of want of corporate power, just like the question of
legality of corporate organization, may only be raised by the sovereign
state. If the state is satisfied with the construction upon which the
corporation acts, and it does not intervene, and no question of public
policy is involved, there is no reason why the issue should be open
to question by someone who has dealt with the corporation. It is my
opinion that the above court is proceeding in the proper direction.
"26Harris v. Independent Gas Co., 76 Kas. 750, 92 Pac. 1123 (1907).
